What was australias forward defence policy

When you combine this with the data requirements of 5th generation platforms like the FA Joint Strike Fighter, MQ-4C Triton program and the growing interest in autonomous vehicles land, air and sea , there is going to need to be significant low latency digital infrastructure required across the north. In preparation for this the Northern Territory Government has been working on various enabling projects to support all of these new capabilities.

In addition to direct defence industrial benefits, the Territory is also poised to become a crucial player in national efforts to counter a wide range of non-defence security risks that go beyond the traditional concerns of defence and foreign policy. These include pandemic management; Space; food, water and energy insecurity; humanitarian and disaster relief; cyber security; protection of critical national infrastructure; border security; law enforcement; biosecurity; supply chain resilience; and critical minerals.

The north is also well positioned to become a more central player in regional efforts to counter a wide range of non-defence security risks that go beyond the traditional concerns of defence policy. These include pandemic management, humanitarian and disaster relief support, border security management and biosecurity.

The north is a natural launch-pad for soft diplomatic and capacity building efforts into the region which reinforce international norms and rules. As noted, the Australian Government has made significant commitments to develop strategic defence and national security capabilities in the north, including through infrastructure projects, fuel storage and supply, training range upgrades and future capability basing.

This investment is likely to increase, as is future investment from the US and other regional partners. Australia needs to break some of the Canberra-centric thinking about how we manage this once in a generation opportunity. Much of current planning is siloed and lacks an over-arching northern Australia strategy that brings this planning into other civilian infrastructure plans. Unsupported Browser Detected. Future submarine program The Australian Government has made it clear that it remains committed to building a sovereign submarine capability and given the large investment in infrastructure that has already been made in southern states it makes sense to continue on this path for the Future Submarine Program build.

Where will these leased submarines be based? A combined logistics, sustainment and maintenance capability The AUSMIN statement makes it clear that we can expect to see more US ships, aircraft and other equipment pre-positioned in Australia. Digital architecture As noted in the AUSMIN statement, there is going to be an increased focus on cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and other data heavy capabilities. A northern Australia strategy In addition to direct defence industrial benefits, the Territory is also poised to become a crucial player in national efforts to counter a wide range of non-defence security risks that go beyond the traditional concerns of defence and foreign policy.

Asia Society Australia acknowledges the support of the Victorian Government. Throughout and the task force was steadily increased in size and effectiveness with the addition of a third battalion, tanks and a Civil Affairs Unit. From the beginning of to mid, a peak force of more than a third of Australia's available combat strength was deployed in Vietnam. It comprised elements from all three services: a three-battalion Army task force with combat and logistic support; an Army advisory team; RAAF helicopters, medium bombers and transport aircraft; and RAN guided-missile destroyers and helicopters.

In this period of heaviest commitment more than 8, Australian service personnel over 7, of them Army personnel were deployed in Vietnam. The escalation of Western military commitment to Vietnam was accompanied by a gradual rise in popular opposition, both in Australia and abroad, to involvement in the War. For the first few years, the Australian commitment in Vietnam was supported by the majority of Australian people.

However by the late s that support had been substantially eroded. The apparent reversal of the Tet Offensive in early and the commencement of formal peace talks in Paris in provoked worldwide opposition to continuing involvement in the War. Australian opposition reached a peak in the large Moratorium rallies in Australian cities in and In June , as the South Vietnamese armed forces assumed greater defence responsibility, President Nixon announced that the US would begin to withdraw its forces.

Throughout and the reduction of Australia's forces continued under the administration of Prime Minister McMahon. By the end of the Australian Army presence had been reduced to personnel.

By mid less than Australian personnel remained and in December Prime Minister Whitlam announced the withdrawal of the final contingent. On 26 February Prime Minister Whitlam announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam North while retaining diplomatic recognition for the Republic of Vietnam South. The last elements of the Australian Army left Vietnam in June In April , after a victorious campaign, the North Vietnamese Army entered Saigon and the President of the Republic of Vietnam surrendered unconditionally.

The formal announcement of the reunification of the two Vietnams was made in with the declaration of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

There was a conspicuous gap between the 'hawkish' political rhetoric of successive Liberal-Country Party governments and the actual level of Australian military commitment to the Vietnam War.

It made a lot of sense while it lasted, but it did not endure. Without declaring a change in policy, the Robert Menzies Government set about transforming the ADF into a force that could defend Australia unaided. By Menzies had, almost by stealth, laid the foundations of a defence force able to protect Australia and its regional interests without relying on allies. Partly as a result, Southeast Asia as a whole began to emerge from decades of crisis and evolve into a region of peace and development.

All these developments made Australia feel safer. At the same time, though for different reasons, Britain withdrew strategically from our region too. The good news was that our region looked much less threatening than it had for many decades.

The bad news was that our allies had made it clear that we would have to deal ourselves with whatever problem might remain. Well before it was clear that Australia needed a new defence policy to deal with this new reality. Fortunately, the new challenges stimulated perhaps the most active and informed defence debate we have ever had—in the universities, the press and within government.

Both the nature of our regional security concerns, and the capacity and willingness of our allies to support us had changed profoundly. These ideas were conclusively established as the foundations of a new defence policy in Australian Defence , the Defence White Paper, published by the government of Malcolm Fraser.

It is a remarkable document. A primary requirement arising from our findings is for increased self-reliance. We do not rule out an Australian contribution to operations elsewhere, if the requirement arose and we felt that our presence would be effective, and if our forces could be spared from their national tasks. But we believe that any operations are much more likely to be in our own neighbourhood than in some distant or forward theatre, and that our Armed Services would be conducting operations together as the Australian Defence Force.

While Sir Arthur Tange forged the unified Defence organisation needed to implement this vision, the implications of these bold new ideas for the ADF were painstakingly worked out. Progress was slow, and many logjams remained when Kim Beazley became Defence Minister in They converted the bold new ideas of Australian Defence into a robust approach to force planning.

Their work was very successful. It won popular support by appealing to a sense of national self-confidence. It reassured our neighbours about our strategic objectives.

It provided a clear basis for disciplined decisions about capability priorities. One measure of this success was the willingness of governments and electorates to fund the policy. Defence spending averaged 2. Perhaps it showed that that public understood there was no alternative to a policy of self-reliance, so we needed to make long-term investments in the necessary capabilities.

Australians took a while to accept the new policy. But once we got used to it, Australians warmed to the idea that we could defend our own continent without having to call on the help of our allies. As General John Baker often remarked, taking responsibility for our own defence provided Australians with a new sense of confidence in their engagement with Asia.